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KESAN STRUKTUR HAKMILIK, MOTIF DAN PEMBAYARAN PREMIUM KE 
ATAS PRESTASI FIRMA PEMBIDA  
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Secara umumnya literatur mengenai pengambilan korporat menyimpulkan 
bahawa pembida rugi atau tidak untung di sekitar pengumuman pengambilalihan. 
Walaupun begitu, statistik telah menunjukkan bahawa pengambilan korporat masih 
menjadi suatu strategi yang popular oleh firma-firma untuk pertumbuhan. Kajian ini 
bertujuan mengisikan jurang persoalan ini dengan menggunakan pendekatan kaedah 
berbeza dan pemilihan sampel yang lebih ketat dalam menangani isu-isu prestasi di 
atas. Kajian ini juga bertujuan memeriksa motif pengambilalihan di Malaysia dan sama 
ada pemilikan saham oleh pemegang saham besar dan identiti mereka akan 
mengurangkan atau memburukkan lagi masalah agensi.  
 
Kajian ini menggunakan 63 pengambilalihan besar oleh syarikat-syarikat senarai 
awam di Malaysia dari 1990 hingga 1999. Data prestasi merangkumi tiga tahun sebelum 
dan empat tahun selepas peristiwa pengambilalihan. Hasil keputusan penganalisaan 
menunjukkan bahawa motivasi pengambilalihan firma sasaran oleh firm pembida ialah  
untuk meningkatkan prestasi firma pembida supaya prestasi firma pembida adalah 
setanding dengan firma dalam industri yang sama. Kebanyakan sasaran 
pengambilalihan adalah dari jenis industri yang berkaitan dengan industri pembida 
supaya mereka dapat menikmati sinergi operasi. Firma sasaran yang berprestasi tinggi 
juga diperolehi supaya dapat mengukuhkan pendapatan pembida. Ini adalah berlainan 
daripada pengambilan korporat di Barat di mana pengambilalihan telah dilihat sebagai 
mendisplinkan pengurus firma sasaran. Memandangkan pertumbuhan ekonomi yang 
cepat dalam 1990an, sinergi kewangan berkecenderungan berlaku dalam kes-kes 
pengambilalihan yang telah membantu firma pembida dalam menubuhkan pasaran 
dalaman yang membolehkannya mengagih modal dengan lebih efisien.  
 xii
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Walaupun begitu, motif untuk mendapat sinergi seperti yang dicadangkan oleh 
teori pengambilalihan tidak dapat menjelaskan variasi dalam prestasi firma pembida 
selepas peristiwa pengambilalihan. Keupayaan firma mendapat keuntungan sinergi 
daripada pengambilalihan adalah bergantung kepada penumpuan saham oleh 
pemegang saham terbesar dan identiti pemegang saham terbesar itu. Walau 
bagaimanapun, kesan penumpuan hak milik saham ke atas prestasi firma pembida 
didapati tidak monotonik; pada tahap yang rendah, ia akan meningkatkan prestasi firma 
pembida tetapi pada tahap yang tinggi (>53 peratus), ia akan mengakibatkan kesan 
yang sebaliknya ke atas prestasi firma pembida. Penemuan ini telah memanjangkan 
teori agensi yang menyatakan peningkatan tumpuan saham oleh pengurus akan 
menigkatkan prestasi firma kerana keselarasan minat antara pengurus dan pemegang 
saham biasa.  
 
Kajian ini juga mendapati hubungan antara pembayaran premium dan prestasi 
selepas pengambilalihan adalah bercorak lengkungan. Penemuan ini telah memberi 
bukti empirikal kepada hipotesis hubris iaitu pembayaran premium yang terlalu tinggi 
akan mengakibatkan pengambilalihan gagal. Penemuan kajian ini juga menunjukkan 
bahawa penumpuan hak milik saham dan pemilikan saham oleh keluarga dapat 
mengurangkan masalah agensi dalam kes-kes melibatkan pengambilalihan.  
 
 
EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, MOTIVES AND PREMIUMS PAID 
ON BIDDING FIRMS’ PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
Generally literature on take-overs highlight that bidders lose or do not gain upon 
the announcement of a take-over. Despite the negative empirical findings, take-over 
activities are still a major corporate manoeuvre for growth as can be seen from the 
increasing trend in the statistics. This study intends to fill the gap by using alternative 
approaches and more stringent sample selection criteria in addressing the above 
performance issue. It also seeks to determine the effect of take-over motives in Malaysia 
and whether ownership by large shareholders and their identity reduce or exacerbate the 
agency problem in cases of Malaysian take-overs.  
  
Using 63 large take-overs by Malaysian public listed firms from 1990 to 1999, 
with three pre and four post-take-over years of observations, the findings indicate that 
corporate take-overs in Malaysia were driven by under-performance of bidders as 
compared to their matched counterparts. More related businesses were acquired by 
bidders as suggested by the operational synergy argument. Most of the take-overs were 
sought to enhance the earning base of the bidders by acquiring well-performing targets 
rather than playing the disciplinary role for managerial synergy. Given the fast economic 
growth in the 1990s, financial synergy mostly incurred in the cases of take-overs that 
have helped in the creation of internal markets that allowed for allocation of capital more 
efficiently.  
 
However, the implied motives for synergies as suggested by take-over theory 
(Megginson and Smart, 2004) are found to have no relationship with the post-take-over 
 xiv
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performance. The potential synergistic gain is contingent on the ownership stakes of the 
largest shareholders and the identity of the largest shareholders in Malaysia. However, 
the effect of concentrated shareholding on performance is not monotonic, it enhances 
performance at the lower level of ownership but causes adverse impact at the higher 
level of ownership (>53 percent). This has extended the current knowledge in agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) that increase in ownership stakes held by managers 
would align the interests of the managers to that of the shareholders.  
 
This study also finds evidence of curvilinear relationship between the premiums 
paid and post-take-over performance. This has provided empirical evidence to hubris 
hypothesis (Roll, 1986) that excessive premiums paid caused the business combination 
to fail.  The evidence from this study also suggests that firms can benefit from family and 
concentrated ownership by reducing the agency problem associated with take-overs.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.0 Background of the Study  
 Business combinations are a norm in a free open market.  The terms such as 
take-overs, mergers, and acquisitions (M&A) mean business combination of target and 
bidder, and are often used interchangeably in the literature. These activities represent 
massive reallocation of resources within an economy. The objectives are to channel 
the corporate assets towards their best possible use. It also enables firms to grow in a 
short period. These popular forms of business investments gained popularity in the 
business world with no exception to Malaysia, especially in the 1990s.   
 
Using the SDC Platinum of Thomson Financial Securities data of Worldwide 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database, Metwalli and Tang (2002) reported that Malaysia 
accounted for 41 percent of the total deals and 38 percent of the M&A transaction 
value of target firms in ASEAN from 1990 to 2000. M&A transactions between local 
firms accounted for 74 percent of all the M&A transactions and about 89 percent of the 
transactions were done by asset acquisitions.  By compiling the announcement records 
from Jan 1991-Jan 2000 in the Investors Digest, this study found that there were about 
781 targets announced in the 1990s. This figure did not include asset acquisition 
transactions.  However, based on our scrutiny of the annual reports and announcement 
files, we found that only about 60 percent of the targets announced which involved 
offers to acquire all or part of the voting shares were successfully taken over by the 
bidders. 
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The Malaysian take-over figures in the 1990s doubled to that of the 1970s and 
1980s combined due to the rapid expansion of the Malaysian capital market. The total 
value of take-over activities was over RM40 billion in 2002 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2004) and RM59 billion in 2005 (Sidhu, 2006) as compared to an estimated RM10 
billion in 1990 (Jayasankaran, 1990). The growth of the Malaysian take-overs was 
catalysed by a number of factors including rapid globalisation of trade and services, 
securing brands and technology by corporations in order to maintain their 
competitiveness. It was also mediated by the fiscal and monetary policies that 
controlled inflation and unemployment while maintaining an average growth rate of five 
percent per year. However, compared to the post-crisis period, the government-led 
initiative to consolidate some industries such as telecommunications, banking and 
finance to ensure domestic and international competitiveness was not that prevalent in 
the 1990s.   
 
 Manne (1965) highlighted that the advantages of take-overs in an economy 
include a lessening of wasteful bankruptcy proceedings, more efficient management of 
corporations, protection for non-controlling corporate investors, increased mobility of 
capital, and generally more efficient allocation of resources. A wave of take-overs in 
recent years has drawn widespread attention, however little attention has been paid to 
the consequences of take-overs. While the motives behind these take-overs received 
only modest attention, these factors ultimately determined whether a merger or 
acquisition was attempted. At the firm level, management of bidding companies often 
highlighted that the take-over strategy was to maximise the wealth of their 
shareholders. Gaughan (1994, 2002) and Megginson and Smart (2004) highlighted that 
in the 1990s, expected synergies were regarded as the primary motives for take-overs 
in order to improve efficiency and achieve better corporate performance. In the 
process, the acquirer often paid a premium over the market value of the targets’ assets 
and technologies for the expected synergies if the two firms were combined. The 
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premiums paid also represented the value of the required improved performance by the 
bidding firms.  
 
 However, past studies have showed that shareholders of acquiring firms were 
no better off or even lose upon the announcements of the business combinations. In 
the long run, bidders lost even more as highlighted by Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 
(1992), Franks and Harris (1989). However, conflicting results were found in 
accounting-based studies in assessing the post-take-over performance. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1989) and Ghosh (2001) who examined earnings performance concluded 
that merged firms had no operating improvement whereas Healy, Palepu, and Krishna 
(1992), Abdul Rahman and Limmack (2004) and Powell and Stark (2005) found 
positive cash flow returns as a result of the business combination.  
 
 In addition to addressing the above unresolved performance issue, this study 
seeks to investigate the possible factors that may cause the variations in post-take-
over performance of the bidding firms by looking into three groups of variables namely 
ownership structure, take-over motives, and premiums paid.  It focuses on take-over 
cases as the bidder would be able to take-over the control of the target firm.   
 
Recent literature widely supports that ownership structure has important 
implications for governance and performance. (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Sudarsanam, Holl, & Salami, 1996). Most studies on take-
overs in developed countries highlighted agency conflicts between shareholders and 
their managers whereby managers, being propertyless, try to maximise their own 
utilities rather than the shareholders’ (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988). In contrast to the diffused ownership structure found in the US, highly 
concentrated ownership especially in the hands of families is a characteristic of many 
East Asian corporations. The concentration of ownership, as highlighted by Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976), would be beneficial to corporations as it allows for greater monitoring 
of managers. It also reduces transaction costs in negotiating and enforcing corporate 
contracts with various stakeholders. This is supported by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) who noted that the absence of separation between ownership and control 
reduces conflicts of interest and this increases shareholder value.  
 
However, the role of the controlling parties to act in the best interest of minority 
shareholders is still debatable. This is due to the reasons that minority shareholders in 
developing countries such as Malaysia have long adopted a passive role and as a 
result of that their rights have often been ignored. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, and Xu (2000) contended that the agency 
problem in Asian countries was intensified by the high concentration of ownership in 
the hands of family members or politically linked business groups.  They argued that 
the primary issue for large corporations in East Asia is limiting expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders, rather than restricting empire building by 
unaccountable managers. In other words, the main principal-agent problem in East 
Asia is not the conflict of interest between owners and managers, but between the 
majority and minority shareholders. This was echoed in studies by Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), Claessens et al (2000), and  Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999) that 
have linked the 1997/98 Asian Financial crisis to the governance structure of 
corporations in the countries involved. These studies have highlighted that the 
entrenched manager or the controlling shareholders in firms with high concentration of 
ownership tend to engage in non-value-maximizing activities for private gains. The 
incidences of related-party transactions, questionable decision making, asset shifting, 
as well as conflicts-of-interest transactions without proper disclosure by directors were 
areas identified by the Securities Commission that caused the vulnerabilities of listed 
companies in the 1997/98 crisis and thus needed strengthening in terms of corporate 
governance. (Securities Commision, 2004, p.171). 
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 Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) highlighted the 
“tunnelling” effect by the controlling party, which reflects that the controlling 
shareholders have strong incentive to transfer out resources from the firm for their own 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. This is often done through 
related-party transaction where the directors or the substantial shareholders of the 
companies buying over the company or assets owned by them at a very high premium. 
Besides, if the controlling parties pursue their own self-interest in order to reduce their 
personal portfolio risk, or control over more companies to get greater perquisites and 
power, the more likely that they will pay a higher premium in order for the target 
shareholders to relinquish their shares.  
 
Although the willingness of the bidders to pay for a premium signals that the 
combined firms will be worth more than the two firms operating as separate entities, 
Roll (1986) and Sirower (1997) contended that the higher the premiums, the greater is 
the value destruction from the acquisition strategy. This is because the acquirer is 
expected not only to meet the existing performance levels but also to meet the even 
higher levels of performance implied by the acquisition premium. Thus, the motive for 
take-over must be driven by synergies that could translate into performance gains 
beyond those that were already expected. If the controlling parties act in their self-
interest, it is likely that the take-over will fail. Hence, the take-over motives, namely 
operational, managerial or financial, are to infer any possible sources of value creation 
or possible agency conflicts that could have a profound impact on the combined firms 
in this study.  
 
  As discussed above, a clear understanding of the effects of concentrated 
ownership and the controlling owner’s identity on corporate decision making, which in 
turn may have an impact on their performance remains limited. Suto (2003) and 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) suggested that further examination on the net effects of 
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concentrated ownership and family businesses in emerging market is needed in order 
to improve corporate management. Thus, the focus of this study is on how the different 
constituencies in the ownership structure of corporation, their motives for take-overs 
and the bid premiums paid could interact with each other and affect the performance of 
the acquiring firms. This study also aims to draw a conclusion whether concentrated 
and family-type ownership would mitigate agency problems or exacerbate the conflicts. 
 
The determinants of premiums paid are also being examined in this study as 
there is a lack of literature on it especially in the Malaysian context. This will provide a 
more insightful background of corporate take-over in Malaysia. Given many similarities 
of corporate governance issues in East Asian corporations especially the concentration 
of ownership in the hand of large shareholders and families, this research may thus 
have valuable lessons for other countries as well.   
 
This study is an extension to the previous take-over studies done in the 
Malaysian context by including agency, efficiency and valuation theory in the analysis. 
Mat Nor and Mohd Zin (1996), Ali (1998) and Abdul Rahman (2000) used the 
Malaysian take-over data from 1977 – 1989, 1980 - 1993, and 1988 - 1992 
respectively. Various take-over characteristics had been examined by them, however, 
they had not looked into the ownership structure of the bidders, the premiums paid and 
their motives for take-overs in explaining the post-take-over performance. Moreover, 
most of the data previously used were from the 1980s; however the scenarios in the 
1990s were very much different from those in the 1980s. For instance, Malaysian take-
overs in the 1980s were mainly driven by political economic factors (Gomez & Jomo, 
1997; Searle, 1999). In the 1980s and early 90s, pressure on the political leadership to 
transfer the assets from state to private sector vis-à-vis redistribution of wealth under 
the NEP (National Economic Policy) had given rise to many politically linked and 
conglomerate style of take-overs (Serle, 1999, p.105). One example is the largest take-
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over of Fleet Group by Renong in late 1980s, which saw the effective control of eight 
publicly listed companies and unlisted subsidiaries. While for the Chinese community, 
MPHB (Multi Purpose Holding Berhad) was set up by MCA (Malaysian Chinese 
Association) to protect the commercial life of the Chinese community in view of the 
constraints posed by NEP had taken over Guthrie, Magnum, Dunlop and others, which 
was claimed as strategic investments by their leaders at that time.  
 
Generally, take-overs in the 1980s were more of conglomerate oriented as 
highlighted in Ali (1998) whereby out of the 37 bidders, 28 pursued conglomerate 
diversification. In the 1990s, corporate take-overs were more focused, for instance out 
of the 136 take-overs in this study, about half of the targets or 73 of them were from 
businesses related to the current business of the bidders. This is an indication that the 
1990s take-overs were more synergistic driven as compared to the 1980s (Gaughan, 
2002). Generally, long-run returns were significantly related to the change in the focus 
of business (Megginson, Morgan & Nail, 2004). With the expansion of the capital 
market from 250 companies (valued at RM43.1 billion) listed on the KLSE in 1980 to 
795 companies (valued at RM444.4 billion) in 2000 plus the impact of the 1997 
financial crisis in the 1990s, the take-over characteristics are expected to be very much 
different from the 1980s.  
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Performance measurement is one of the most important issues concerning the 
survival of firms and to a large extent to the competitiveness of a nation. Therefore, if 
the allocation of capital is made to poorly considered targets, it may eventually cause 
the market to be less efficient and eventually may lead to low levels of trust and stymie 
growth.  
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It has been consistently reported that the majority of the bidders lose or do not 
gain upon the announcement of a take-over. In Malaysia, similar findings were found 
by Mat Nor and Mohd Zin (1996) and Ali (1998). The average negative reaction implies 
that investors expect future performance of the combined firms would not be improved. 
However, using the accounting-based studies, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), 
Abdul Rahman (2004) and Powell and Stark (2005) found positive cash flow returns as 
a result of mergers. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Ghosh (2001) who examined 
earnings performance, on the other hand have concluded that merged firms have no 
operating improvement. Despite the negative and conflicting empirical findings, take-
over activities are still a major corporate manoeuvre for growth as can be seen from the 
survey by Metwali and Tang (2002). In this study, two alternative performance 
measures namely the accounting-based measure and the market-based measure were 
used. The control adjusted accounting-based measure was used to capture effects of 
actual changes in fundamental value while the control adjusted market-based measure 
was used to capture the value perceived by the investors. Thus, these two alternative 
measures were used to check the consistency and robustness of the method used in 
assessing the post-take-over performance.  
 
As highlighted earlier, recent literature widely supports that ownership structure 
has important implications for governance and performance. Most studies on take-
overs in developed countries highlighted agency conflicts between shareholders and 
their managers where the share ownership in the corporations were dispersed. 
Malaysian corporations, on the other hand, displayed a very high concentration of 
share ownership that was controlled by the dominant owners. However, the role of the 
controlling parties to act in the best interest of the minority shareholders is still 
debatable. Controlling shareholders may align their interests to that of the minority 
shareholders or act in their self-interest such as tunnelling out corporate resources 
(Johnson et al, 2000) in related-party transaction. They may also pay a higher premium 
 8 
 
for a target so that they could gain more perquisite consumptions for controlling a 
larger empire. As such, Roll (1986) and Sirower (1997) argued that the higher the 
premium, the greater is the value destruction from the acquisition strategy. A clear 
understanding of the effects of concentrated ownership and the identity of the dominant 
owners on corporate decision making, which in turn may have an impact on corporate 
performance, is still limited. Instead of focusing on the indirect relationship between 
ownership and performance (Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Thomsen & Petersen, 2000; 
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), this study aims to attain specific evidence of the behaviour of 
the controlling shareholders, namely their discretion over corporate decisions on 
motives for take-overs and the levels of premiums paid. The study also aims to assess 
the interaction effect between motives for take-overs, premiums paid and ownership 
structure on post-take-over performance. Finally, it also seeks to draw a conclusion 
whether concentrated and family-type ownership would reduce agency problems or 
aggravate the conflicts.   
 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 Research questions below are raised to address the research problems above. 
 
(i) Do operating performance and firm value improve after a take-over?  
(ii) What were the motives for firms to engage in take-overs in Malaysia? 
(iii) Does ownership structure (namely ownership concentration and the 
identity of the dominant owners) mitigate the agency problem or 
exacerbate it? Does ownership structure lead to the expropriation of 
minority shareholders?  
(iv) What is the relationship between premiums paid and take-over 
performance? 
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(v) Does the identity of dominant owners (namely family ownership) 
influence the levels of premiums paid and performance? 
(vi) What are the determinants of premiums paid? Does ownership structure 
moderate the relationship between take-over motives and levels of 
premium paid? 
 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 The need for information on the relationship between take-over motives, 
structure of ownership, bid premiums and the performance of the acquiring firms in 
Malaysia dictates the objectives of this investigation, which are as follows: 
 
(i) to determine the post-take-over operating performance and firm value of the 
bidding firm 
(ii) to determine the take-over motives in Malaysia 
(iii) to determine the effects of take-over motives, ownership structure, and 
premiums paid on the post-take-over performance of the acquiring 
companies.  
(iv) to identify the determinants of premiums paid.  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Given the potential impact of corporate take-overs, knowledge on ownership 
structure, the motives for take-overs, determinants of premiums paid and their 
consequences are important for a host of decision makers as follows: 
 
(i) Investors - especially the non-controlling shareholders and other retail 
investors who supply funds in exchange for risk capital, would be interested 
to know the impact of the take-overs. This study provides knowledge on the 
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determinants of post take-over performance. Investors may also use the 
models to price and evaluate tender offers and formulate appropriate 
investment strategies.   
 
(ii) Potential bidders who are interested in pursuing external growth strategy 
would benefit from insights on the motives for take-overs and their 
consequences under different ownership structure and the levels of 
premiums paid. This knowledge would assist managers to make more 
informed managerial decisions, increase their bargaining power and thus 
increase the likelihood of more efficient take-overs.  
 
(iii) Government policy makers and regulatory agencies such as Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM), Securities Commission (SC), and others would be 
interested in information on take-overs, and distribution of ownership for 
planning and regulating economic development. This thesis provides insight 
on the issue, and effects of large shareholdings as well as pricing behaviour 
of the corporate control market. Thus, it would help the authorities to revisit 
the adequacy of the current listing requirements especially with regard to 
ownership distribution and the Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers 
to enhance the Malaysian equity market as an attractive avenue for 
investment.  
 
(iv) Researchers would benefit from this study as the findings of this study 
relates to managerial theories such as agency conflicts and the 
performance of firms in a developing country such as Malaysia. The 
theoretical contribution of this study includes advancing the knowledge of 
the agency theory and efficiency theory in relation to M&A in the context of a 
developing country. Specifically, it provides further evidence in explaining 
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the conflict of interests (or alignment of interest) between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders in developing countries. The unique 
institutional background of Malaysia provides an alternative view on the 
effect of concentrated corporate ownership and family owned firms in 
corporations involved in take-overs. It also offers a model for bid premium 
valuation, and lastly contributes to the knowledge in efficiency theory 
(Mueller, 1995; Trautwein, 1990) by operationalising the motives for take-
overs in Malaysia.  
 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter one of the thesis describes the background, problem statement, 
research questions, objectives of the study, significance of the study and organisation 
of the thesis. Chapter two describes the regulatory framework and history of M&A in 
Malaysia. Chapter three reviews literature and develops respective hypotheses. 
Chapter four discusses the sample and methodology used, variable definitions and a 
priori expectation on the models used. Analyses of results are presented in Chapter 
five. Chapter six discusses, concludes, and highlights the contribution and limitations of 
the study and suggestions for future research.  
CHAPTER TWO 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 This section discusses the development of the Malaysian equity and corporate 
control market, and the regulatory framework that governs take-over activities. The 
formation of concentrated ownership and control in the corporate sector, investor 
characteristics, and shareholder protection are also highlighted to enhance the 
understanding of the institutional background of Malaysia and the dynamic aspect of 
the Malaysian corporate take-over activities. 
 
 
2.1 Development of the Malaysian Equity Market  
Although relatively new in the world capital market, the expansion of the 
Malaysian capital market was spectacular. In the early days (1900s), most companies 
with shares traded were companies founded by the British, encouraged by the boom in 
rubber and tin industries. These companies included Guthrie & Co Ltd, Fraser and 
Neave Co Ltd, Malakoff Plantation Co Ltd, and Sime Darby & Co Ltd (Securities 
Commission [SC], 2004). The shares were traded informally at popular meeting places 
such as colonial clubs, shop houses, and coffee shops. In 1930, the first formal 
organisation of stockbrokers, the Singapore Stockbrokers’ Association was 
established. In 1957, following the independence of Malaya, the Central Bank, Capital 
Issue Committee and stock exchange were established to develop the equity market. 
The aim was to use the equity market as a corner stone for economic development. 
(SC, 2004, p.7). 
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The inception of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or KLSE (now Bursa 
Malaysia) was in 1973. The name was changed from the Malayan Stock Exchange 
(1960) to Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore following the secession of 
Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. In 1973, with the termination of currency 
interchangeability between Malaysia  and Singapore, the Stock Exchange of Malaysia 
and Singapore was officially separated into the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and 
Singapore Stock Exchange. Since then, the number of companies listed on the KLSE 
grew from 262 in 1970s to 795 in year 2000. As of August 2005 it recorded 1006 
companies listed with 640 companies on the main board, 272 on the second board 
(established in 1989), and 94 on the MESDAQ (Malaysian Exchange of Securities 
Dealing and Automated Quotation). 
 
After India and Hong Kong, the spectacular growth of the Malaysian capital 
markets has made it ranked the third largest number of listed companies among 
countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). It was also ranked the largest stock market in Southeast Asia in terms of 
market value in 2003 (SC, 2004, p.257).  The market valuation was estimated at 
RM43.1 billion in the 1980s and grew to RM706.36 billion in August 2005. In terms of 
the value of funds raised in the capital market, it was a mere 4 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1993. The amount grew to 13 percent in 2003. The decade 
also saw the amount of funds raised in the capital market growing by 34 percent, 
compared to bank lending growth of only 12 percent. Table 2.1 provides the summary 
statistics of the growth of Bursa Malaysia since its inception till 2005.  
 
During the 1990s, the equity market experienced two extreme conditions: the 
super  bull-run in 1993-1994  and  the financial crisis in 1997-1998.   The growth in the  
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Table 2. 1 
Number of Companies Listed at the Bursa Malaysia from 1973-2005 
Total Number of Listed Companies 
Year Main Board  Second Board MESDAQ  TOTAL
2005 646 268 107 1021 
2004 622 278 63 963 
2003 598 276 32 906 
2002 562 294 12 868 
2001 520 292    - 812 
2000 498 297    - 795 
1999 474 283    - 757 
1998 454 282    - 736 
1997 444 264    - 708 
1996 413 208    - 621 
1995 369 160    - 529 
1994 347 131    - 478 
1993 329 84    - 413 
1992 317 52    - 369 
1991 292 32    - 324 
1990 271 14    - 285 
1989 305 2    - 307 
1988 295 -    - 295 
1987 291 -    - 291 
1986 288 -    - 288 
1985 284 -    - 284 
1984 282 -    - 282 
1983 271 -    - 271 
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1982 261 -    - 261 
1981 253 -    - 253 
1980 250 -    - 250 
1979 253 -    - 253 
1978 253 -    - 253 
1977 256 -    - 256 
1976 264 -    - 264 
1975 268 -    - 268 
1974 264 -    - 264 
1973 262 -    - 262 
Note. Retrieved on August 31, 2005, from http://www.bursamalaysia.com 
 
 
Malaysian capital market was mainly due to the inflow of foreign portfolio into the 
country, followed by the incorporation of Malaysian stocks into a number of global 
benchmark indices. It is also stimulated by the sound economic policies implemented 
by the Malaysian government such as lower interest rates compared to other countries 
in the regions, and attractive corporate earnings.  
 
In order to encourage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to raise capital in 
the market, the Second Board was introduced in 1988 to facilitate the listing of these 
small and medium enterprises. These SME were usually from the industries that had 
shown good track record in earnings and had attractive growth prospects. MESDAQ 
was set up in 1997 to provide high growth and technology-based companies with little 
or no proven track record to seek financing in the capital market. The setting up of the 
Second Board and MESDAQ has facilitated an influx of comparatively smaller, family-
owned companies seeking listing status in equity market.  
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2.2  Development of the Corporate Control Market 
The take-over activities also followed the growth of the capital market. In the 
1970s, there were only 40 take-overs announced as shown in Table 2.2. The number 
has increased by about ten times to 394 in the 1980s and further rose to 781 in the 
1990s. Take-over activities were especially concentrated at the beginning of the 1990s 
when the equity market experienced the super bull run.  
 
 
Table 2. 2 
Number of Take-overs from 1970s to 1990s 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Announcements 40 394 781 
Confirmed take-overs    
    Targets from non-public listed companies 10 132 376 
    Targets from public listed firms   2   29   62 
    Targets from foreign firms   4   25   28 
Total  16 186 466 
Note. Compiled from Investors Digests (various issues), KLSE Announcement files, and Annual 
Companies Handbook (various issues).  
 
 
The value of take-over transaction in 1990 was estimated at about RM10 billion 
(Jayasankaran, 1990). However, this value has increased to about RM50 billion in 
2003 (PricewaterhouseCooper,2004) and RM 60 billion (Sidhu, 2006) in 2005. A study 
by Metwalli and Tang (2002) reported that the Malaysian M&A transaction value 
including asset acquisitions between 1990-2000 was at USD124.8 billion with 2430 
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deals materialised. Some of these transactions were financed by cash but the majority 
were financed by equity.  
 
The exponential growth of M&A activities in the 1990s was due to a number of 
factors, for instance, as mentioned in Chapter one, rapid globalisation of trade and 
services and the expansion of the Malaysian equity market have induced corporations 
pursuing growth strategies by acquiring brands and technology 
(PricewaterhouseCooper, 2004). This is the fastest and less risky mode of entering into 
a new business in order to gain technology and market share.  
 
In addition, the setting up of the Second Board, which allowed for the listing of 
relatively smaller companies, had aggravated the take-over activities whereby these 
companies were targeted for backdoor listing or a reverse take-over. A reverse take-
over or back-door listing involved the acquisition of an unlisted company by a listed 
company which results in the owners of the unlisted company becoming the new 
controlling shareholders of the listed company (SC, 2004, p.65). 
 
The depletion of tin in the mining sector and low commodity prices, had also 
contributed to the increase in take-over activities from particularly, commodity based 
corporations. Take-over activities acted as a means to improve the earning base of 
these companies. As such in the 1980s, many take-overs were directed to unrelated 
sectors. For instance, Kampung Lanjut Tin Dredging Bhd. has changed its core 
business in tin mining into property development, investment, and financial services. 
This gave the company the features of a conglomerate structure group.  
 
The growth of the conglomerate groups in the Malaysian economy was 
pronounced. They operated a wide range of across a diversified range of activities 
within a sector as well as across many sectors in the economy. For example, the 
 18
 
business of CMS, a conglomerate group based in Sarawak involved business from 
plantation, mining, manufacturing, trading and services to construction and property 
development. The effect of conglomeration spilled over to take-over activities, many 
multiple bids were announced in a single announcement (Appendix 2). For instance, 
on 25 October 1994, Advance Synergy Bhd announced the acquisition of the United 
Merchant Bank, Cherating Holiday Villa Sdn. Bhd., Langkawi Holiday Villa Sdn. Bhd., 
Mayor Hotel Bhd, and Plastic Centre Sdn. Bhd. A series of acquisitions were also 
witnessed during the period; for example Autral Amalgamated, announced the 
acquisitions of the Malaya Ceramic Industries Sdn. Bhd. in 1990, Danau Kota 
Development in 1991, Chong Fui Shipping and Forwarding Sdn. Bhd., Mandarin 
Tours and Travel Sdn. Bhd., and Likas View Sdn. Bhd. in 1994.   
 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2003) highlighted that the extensive 
diversification of Malaysian firms in the 1990s resulted in misallocation of capital 
investment as capital was channelled towards less profitable and more risky business 
segments. They revealed that out of 531 Malaysian firms surveyed from the period of 
1991-1996 from the Worldscope database, 70 percent were involved in multi-segment 
businesses as they operated more than one two-digit SIC code industries.  Firms 
were classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent of their total sales were 
derived from one two-digit SIC code segment, otherwise they were classified as multi-
segment firms. Malaysia ranked second after Singapore, which recorded 72 percent. 
The average figure was 65 percent for all the nine countries surveyed.   
 
In terms of the successful rate of take-overs, it was quite low at about 40 
percent in the 1970s. It increased to about 60 percent in the 1990s. Many deals were 
cancelled in the early days mainly due to weak law and enforcement on take-over 
announcements. Very often little financial information was disclosed upon an 
announcement of a take-over. As most Malaysian investors were retail investors who 
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were not sophisticated, upon announcement of a take-over, it would lead to the 
escalation of share price movement. However, when a deal was called off share prices 
would experience a sharp decline. The unhealthy speculative activity that surrounded 
the announcement of a take-over had lead to the cashing out of the majority 
shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders. As a result, this had lead to 
the revision of Malaysian Code of Takeover and Mergers (the Code) whereby more 
stringent rules on take-over were imposed (SC, 1998). 
 
      
2.3 Regulatory Framework 
Malaysia adopts the English common law in its legal system. The primary Act of 
Parliament governing companies is the Companies Act, 1965. The Security Industry 
Act, 1983 and Securities Commission Act, 1993 are two other statutes that directly 
govern the public listed companies. Other relevant laws include the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (Now Bursa Malaysia) Rules and the Foreign Investment Committee 
Guidelines.  
 
The regulatory authorities include the Companies Commission of Malaysia 
(CCM, formerly Registrar of Companies), The Bursa Malaysia (formerly KLSE), and the 
Securities Commission (SC). The principal duty of CCM is to ensure companies, 
whether they are private or public companies, comply with the provisions of the 
Companies Act and the subsidiary legislation made thereunder. The Bursa Malaysia, 
on the other hand, governs the conduct of public listed companies and enforces listing 
and disclosure requirements. The SC regulates the affair of the listed companies which 
include a wide range of power such as regulating take-overs, mergers and acquisition 
of companies, ensures proper conduct by the companies and their officers, and so on. 
The purpose of the SC was to promote the development of the capital market and to 
take responsibility for streamlining the regulations of the securities market, speeding up 
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the processing and approval of corporate transaction and to protect the interest of 
investors (SC, 2004, p.49). 
 
Prior to 1993, the regulatory body that governed take-overs activities was the 
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers (the Panel). Pursuant to section 179 of the 
Companies Act, the Panel administered the Code on Take-overs and Mergers 1987 
and issued various practice notes. The practice notes were issued from time to time to 
serve as a guide to the application of the Code. The 1987 Code consists of three parts: 
part one dealt with definitions, part two comprised of 14 general principles and part 
three contained 40 rules.  
 
The establishment of Securities Commission (SC) in 1993 saw the formulation 
of the Securities Commission Act (SCA), 1993. Take-overs and mergers are now 
governed by the provision contained in part IV Division 2 of the Securities Commission 
(Amendment) Act 1995. A review of the 1987 Code was made in 1998 as stricter 
liabilities and obligations on market participant were deemed important to ensure the 
adequate protection of minority shareholders’ right. The current Code in use is the 
Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers, 1998. The Code applies to the take-over 
of all public companies and private limited companies which satisfies certain 
conditions. First, pursuant to Practice Note 1.2 of the Code, it applies to a take-over of 
a private company if it has shareholders’ funds of a paid up capital of RM10 million 
(while in the previous Code it was RM5 million) or more based on the latest audited 
accounts or for a purchase consideration of more than RM20 million (RM10 million in 
the previous Code). The second condition imposed under the Code is the acquisition of 
shares giving rise to the control of over 33 percent of the voting rights of companies. 
 
The principles of the Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers (1998) is in 
accordance with the provision of subsection 33A(3) of the Securities Commission Act. 
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It stipulates that the acquisition of voting shares shall take place in an efficient, 
competitive and informed market. It shall have considered the objectives as stated in 
subsection 33A (5) of the Act. This is a revision to the Malaysian Code on Take-overs 
and Mergers 1987, previously administered by the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, 
and the Capital Issues Committee’s Guidelines for the New Issue of Securities and the 
Valuation of Public Listed Companies. The Code on Take-overs and Mergers 1998, 
which is currently adhered to, consists of nine parts with 42 codes, three schedules and 
various practice notes. Part I of the Code deals with definitions and general principles, 
Parts II and III outline the application of mandatory and partial offers, Parts IV, V and VI 
delineate announcement, terms and timing of offers, Parts VII and VIII draw obligation 
of offeror and offeree in relation to offer and Part IX deals with general issues such as 
false and misleading information, and others.  
 
 With the introduction of the new Code, the SC becomes the sole authority and 
regulator for matters relating to take-overs and mergers. The emphasis now is on the 
adequate disclosure of information to all parties involved in take-over and merger 
exercises. This is to ensure that all take-overs, mergers and compulsory acquisitions 
take place in a competitive, informed and efficient market. Strict criminal liability was 
also introduced for the failure to adhere to adequate disclosure standards. The 
intention of SC is to shift the regulatory approach from a merit-based to a disclosure-
based system of regulation so that investment decisions made by each individual 
investor are based on complete and reliable information provided by the issuer or 
offeror of securities.  
 
Previously, under the merit-based system, the SC would assess the pricing of 
securities, utilisation of proceeds arising from the issuance of securities, valuation of 
assets and the overall viability of the corporate proposal to ensure that only “quality 
securities” were made available to investors. The SC’s Asset Valuation Audit 
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Department was established in 1995 to provide fair consideration of corporate 
proposal submitted by public companies that were involved in property asset 
valuation. Prior to this, the valuation was undertaken by the Ministry of Finance, a 
practice carried over from the Capital Issue Committee.   
 
The merit-based system was adopted at the early stage of capital market 
development with the purpose of safe guarding the investors, especially the retail 
investors from potential fraud or market misconduct. However, this has caused a moral 
hazard as investors would perceive that the company would be a good investment, and 
it is needless to evaluate the merits or risks of investing.  Seaward (1993) provided 
evidence that the average underpricing of IPO in Malaysia was extremely high at 149 
percent as a result of the merit-based system. In 2003, in an effort by the SC to be a 
full-disclosure-based regime, the 1996 Guidelines on Asset Valuation were amended to 
incorporate requirements for higher disclosure standards and due diligence by the 
valuers.  It has categorised assets as identified/non identified. Only those assets that 
fell under the “identified” category, such as property assets where valuation abuses 
were most likely to occur, will be reviewed by the SC (SC, 2004). 
  
The implementation of the disclosure-based system also saw that directors, 
substantial shareholders and persons connected with the companies were prohibited 
from voting on any resolution on a related party-transaction (SC, 2004). In order to 
further enhance transparency, an amendment was made in 1998 to the Securities 
Industry (Central Depository) Act 1991. The amended Act required that the identity of 
the owners who held shares in nominee account exceeding 5 percent must be 
revealed.  
 
 The Guidelines for the Reverse Take-overs and Backdoor listing was 
introduced in 1994, induced by the increasingly popular method of going public by 
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reverse take-overs in the early 1990s. The period 1993-1994, in particular, was 
characterized as highly speculative. A reverse take-over announcement would lead to 
spectacular escalating prices without due regard for the regulatory risks involved or its 
real future potential. This was especially, in the tin, property and plantation sectors 
where their indices outperformed the rest, which climbed on expectation on reverse 
take-over bids. During that year, the Plantation Index rose by 219 percent, Tin Index by 
379 percent, and Finance Index rose by 224 percent. The reverse take-overs 
comprised acquisitions of timber concessions, stock broking companies as well as oil 
and gas businesses.  
 
 The reverse take-over as a popular mode to get a company listed could be due 
to the inefficiency of the approval process. It was difficult to get companies listed due to 
the long waiting time and bureaucracy in the early years. As a case in point, a take-
over bid for a listed company required approval from the FIC (which was in the Prime 
Minister’s Department) and subsequently the CIC (under the Ministry of Finance). If the 
proposal is approved, then it would be submitted to the panel on Take-over and 
Mergers (under the Ministry of Trade and Industry) for further evaluation and approval. 
On top of this, it also required approvals of the relevant sectoral regulators of 
companies involved in the take-over bid. For instance, if a financial institution was 
involved, Bank Negara Malaysia’s approval was required; and if a manufacturing 
company was involved, the approval of the Ministry of Trade and Industry was needed. 
In addition to the many agencies involved, most of the committees in charge did not 
operate on a full time basis and each had its own guidelines and conditions for 
approval.  
 
The supervision and development of the capital market at that time were merely 
a secondary function of the various regulatory authorities. This had resulted in 
opportunistic taking activities whereby some deals even involved selling their listed 
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